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This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and con-
tractual obligations to providers) a￿ects accountability. There are two main e￿ects. (1)
Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public de-
mands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the
public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly
holdup the public by in￿ating the government’s cost of implementing these adaptations.
So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a
way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure
and increase consumer prices.
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1\[T]he key to reforming the public sector is not the pro￿t motive, but democracy
and accountability."1
1 Introduction
Central and local governments are contracting out the provision of an increasingly broad range
of public services. In this paper, I investigate the theoretical basis of concerns that privatising
provision is reducing political accountability. Political accountability does remain crucial {
public funding weakens the provider’s direct (market price) accountability to consumers { but
the voting public’s control over providers was already indirect under public governance, since
politicians generally delegate provision tasks to unelected agents. So privatising provision is
only a problem if it restricts politicians’ ability to transfer public pressure onto the service
providing agents, or demotivates the public from holding politicians accountable.
The recent furore over free school dinners in the U.K. o￿ers a good illustration. In the
aftermath of celebrity chef Jamie Oliver’s televised criticisms of school dinner quality in early
2005, the British government rushed to quench mounting public discontent by committing
to higher standards. However, state schools that outsource catering were unable to force
their providers to meet these standards; Lawrence and Quarmby (2005) reported how schools
\locked into 25-year contracts through private ￿nance initiatives are ￿nding that they cannot
rid their menus of junk food despite the government’s pledge".2 By contrast, state schools
with publicly-managed catering were able to adapt quickly to the public demand for healthier
school dinners.
To analyse the adaptation in￿exibilities suggested by this example, I present a model of
service provision that adds two novel features to the set-up of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
henceforth denoted HSV. In HSV (and other formal work), the public are passive bystanders
and the government is not involved in adaptation. Hart (2003) writes: \the idea that govern-
ment ownership leads to more entrepreneurship by bureaucrats seems less [plausible]." However,
to be accountable, politicians must investigate and discover how to satisfy public demands.
Furthermore, to hold politicians accountable, the public must discover their own preferences,
communicate them to the politicians, and mobilise to pressure for service improvements. So
1David Hinchli￿e, Chair, House of Commons Health Select Committee, in Pollock, Shaoul and Player (2001).
2Catering contracts are typically shorter (at 5 years), but still problematic, especially since it is hard for
activists to stay mobilised and maintain issue salience. E.g., in Islington, London, where the private company,
Cambridge Education Authority (CEA), runs the state schools, CEA signed 5-year contracts outsourcing pro-
vision of school dinners to a private caterer (Scolarest) and CEA’s schools have (so far) neither managed to
negotiate an opt out from Scolarest, nor an improvement in Scolarest’s service quality.
2in my model: (1) the government (e.g. city mayor) exerts e￿ort to understand and calculate
how to respond to public demands; (2) the public (who are only third parties to the service
contract) exert e￿orts to evaluate service quality, discover feasible alternatives and pressure
for change.
First, I show that when the government cannot anticipate desirable service adaptations in
its outsourcing contracts, it ends up having to pay more for these adaptations under private
than public provision. My main result here is that this cost in￿ation demotivates both the
government and the public from exerting the e￿orts that generate accountability. Second, I
compare the political and social bene￿ts from privatising; politicians may bias towards pri-
vatising so as to reduce public e￿orts to hold them accountable. Unlike existing theories (e.g.
HSV) on how privatisation might lower service quality, the mechanism that drives my results
can also explain why privatising tends to raise consumer service prices (see Kwoka (2002 and
2005) and Guasch (2005) for empirical evidence3). The reason is that privatising dissuades
the public from mobilising, so politicians have less incentive to pay the costs of restraining
consumer prices.
I illustrate the underlying logic in the context of school dinner catering in a village school.
The village mayor is too busy to manage catering directly so she pays a manager to provide the
school dinners. In the case of public provision, the mayor retains control of the assets needed
for catering and pays the manager to devote time to run the service according to her orders. By
contrast, when the mayor opts for private provision, she gives the manager signi￿cant control
rights and signs a long-term contract guaranteeing the manager a ￿xed payment in return for
a well-de￿ned catering service. As in HSV, privatising provision stops the mayor from holding
up the manager, so the manager’s cost-cutting incentives rise.4 Unlike in HSV, the underlying
problem with privatisation is that the mayor may then rely on the manager’s cooperation in
order to exploit adaptation gains.
For instance, if activists convince the mayor that the dinners must become healthier, the
mayor cannot oblige the private manager to adapt the menus accordingly; furthermore, (usu-
3A number of empirical papers show that privatisation can raise prices. For instance, privatisation of elec-
tricity utilities was widely predicted to lower consumer prices, but Kwoka (2002 and 2005) compares public and
private provision of electricity in the U.S. and ￿nds that \public ownership is associated with signi￿cantly lower
[residential consumer] prices" as well as higher quality. Similarly, Guasch (2005) shows that privatisation in
many countries has led to higher prices for a range of service sectors.
4While the mayor can hold up a public manager by paying less after the manager cuts his cost, a private
contract ￿xes what the mayor must pay for the basic catering service. So privatisation can reduce basic service
costs. Formally, the (long-term) private contract prevents holdup of the manager’s speci￿c investment (and
enhanced control rights enable the private manager to exploit his cost innovations).
3ally) the mayor cannot credibly pay an alternative manager to provide healthier food alongside
the basic service from the incumbent manager; such a side-trade would either partially dupli-
cate the incumbent’s basic service or waste economies of scope).5 By contrast, under public
provision, the mayor can usually replace, over-rule or sideline the incumbent catering man-
ager for disobeying orders to adapt to healthier ingredients. So a private (but not a public)
manager can hold up the mayor for a share of the mayor’s gain from adaptation. This holdup
demotivates the mayor from attentively listening to public demands and working out how to
satisfy them.
The private manager can also indirectly hold up the activists. Activist pressure raises the
mayor’s adaptation bene￿t. The private manager therefore charges the mayor an in￿ated price
for adaptation. Since the mayor pays using public money, this price in￿ation demotivates the
public from participating in service evaluation and pressuring for service improvements.
These direct and indirect holdup e￿ects are usually mutually reinforcing: the mayor has no
incentive to investigate public concerns if the public do not mobilise enough to hold the mayor
accountable; conversely, the public only bene￿t from mobilising if the mayor is receptive to
pressure. This strategic complementarity raises the bene￿t from keeping catering in-house to
raise dynamic accountability relative to the bene￿t from outsourcing to raise the provider’s
cost-cutting incentives.
The tradeo￿ also depends on the di￿culty of accessing alternative providers alongside a
long-term contract. So I apply Ellman (2006) to suggest how contract design can limit the
accountability problem and to predict where privatisation will be particularly harmful. I also
brie￿y discuss the possibilities of mixing public and private delivery options (see Warner and
Hefetz (2006)) and of contracting out to not-for-pro￿t organisations (see Besley and Ghatak
(1998), Bennet and Iossa (2005)) or neighbouring municipalities (see Bajari and Tadelis (2006)).
My positive analysis of the privatisation decision in section 5, simply compares the politi-
cian’s choice of provision mode with that which voters would select in a referendum (or in an
election where politicians compete on public and private provision platforms). I characterise
(the \avoid the public eye") setting where politicians are biased (relative to voter preferences)
towards privatising.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of service provi-
sion. Section 3 solves the model for subgame-perfect equilibria when the provision mode is
predetermined. Section 4 solves for the provision modes that would be chosen by ￿rst the
5The basic service contract may even contain an exclusive territory clause that directly prevents the mayor
from side-trading with alternative caterers. Also to exploit the adaptation opportunity, the mayor could need
control rights that she only retains in the public case, so the general ideas summarised in Hart (1995) apply.
4government and then the people. Section 5 presents the public pressure version of the model.
Section 6 discusses the results, presents alternative perspectives and applies the analysis to
help understand speci￿c case studies of privatised services. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
There are many interesting papers on public-private governance following the framework of
HSV or analyse contracting under asymmetric information.6 To the best of my knowledge,
none of them give an active role to either the public or the government. These two extensions
on HSV are crucial in my analysis of accountability. (I also extend existing work in the HSV
vein by building on Ellman’s (2006) model of how and when long-term contracts interfere with
market forces.) Existing results are based on distorted incentives for the manager/contractor.
My results are based on loss of incentives for the government and public. My accountability
explanation shares the existing prediction of low quality, but the mechanism is very di￿erent,
as indicated by the unique, direct explanation of Kwoka’s (2002 and 2005) and Guasch’s (2005)
evidence on pricing.
My work is also linked to the literature on political economy and in￿uence. Milgrom
and Roberts (1988) show how restrictive commitments may serve to reduce undesirable in-
￿uence within ￿rms. Bennedsen (2000) develops a common agency model where politicians
adjust/distort their policies to earn contributions from lobbyists. The public are passive (im-
plicitly susceptible in elections to the persuasion of well-funded polititical parties), but the be-
haviour of the union lobby bears some parallels with the activist public in my model; Bennedsen
shows that privatising control can demotivate lobbying by unions.7 For my second (pressure)
interpretation of the public’s role in service adaptation, I appeal to Besley and Burgess’s (2001
and 2002) model of accountability. Their model derives how governments become more re-
sponsive to people when people become more aware of how government actions a￿ect them. In
6One important alternative perspective maintains that privatisation reduces government access to information
(see e.g. Shapiro and Willig (1990) and Schmidt (1996)). My results could be derived from this perspective,
since privatisation would then hinder the government in negotiating acceptable terms of trade for valuable
adaptations { asymmetric information generates an \undertrading problem". Another important perspective is
that of La￿ont and Tirole (1991) who show that privatisation introduces a common agency problem by adding
a new set of principals - the shareholders. My analysis emphasises a di￿erent additional set of principals - the
voters - whose control is limited to voting in elections.
7My approach demonstrates how increased governmental control rights invite greater pressure by the general
public and not just organised lobbyists. Furthermore, I have unique equilibria and do not need Bennedsen’s
(2000) assumption that shareholders and unionists can contract with the government while unable to negotiate
with each other. On the other hand, Bennedsen (2000) covers the role of shareholders: privatising cash-￿ow
rights (corporatisation) creates a shareholder lobby that counterbalances the union lobby.
5their work, the freedom of the press determines public awareness. In my analysis, it is activist
members of the public who determine public awareness (perhaps by encouraging, persuading
and helping newspapers to report on the public service issue).
2 The Model
This section presents a simple model of the choice between public and private modes of gov-
ernance for a public service (such as park maintenance, road maintenance, garbage collection,
care of the elderly, health care, transportation, water, education or school dinner catering).
I endogenise the accountability of politicians to changing public demands by adding a third
party (the public) within the framework of HSV. So there are three actors: a government G
(e.g. a mayor, local government or elected agency head), a manager M and an action group
A, representing aggregate public activism and participation in politics.
G uses public funds to organise service provision on the public’s behalf. G always delegates
the service provision task to a manager (M), but can choose between public (\in-house")
provision and private provision (\outsourcing" to a private organisation). So M can be a
public manager/employee or a private manager. (As in HSV, funding is fully public and I
model manager-owned ￿rms.)
There are two crucial di￿erences between public and private provision: privatisation for-
mally delegates residual control and uses long-term performance contracts to delegate speci￿c
service obligations. Under private provision, G and M sign a long-term contract committing
G to pay for, and M to provide, a de￿ned public service over a de￿ned period (see ￿ below);
G also transfers to M su￿cient residual rights of control to provide this service free of inter-
ference (temporarily in a concession or forever as when M owns key assets). Under public
provision, G retains ownership and control; typically G then covers input costs and compen-
sates M’s exclusive labour dedication; see Ellman (1999) and Levin and Tadelis (2006). The
public/private distinction matters, because it a￿ects what happens when G and M need to
make unanticipated changes in their joint trade; over time, G and M may learn better ways to
write contracts or satisfy a given contract.
At the start of their relationship, G and M can only negotiate a \basic" performance
contract, X. I normalise the non-contingent transfer in X to that which just compensates
for standard costs of provision: X generates (net) payo￿ ￿ows of b for G and w(e) for M
where w(e) is M’s cost advantage (over a standard provider) from investing e in specialising
to G. While M invests e to cut costs, G and A invest e￿orts i and j (respectively) to discover
improved policies and technologies. These e￿orts, motivated below, permit G and M to adapt
6the basic contract X to changing public preferences and possibilities. (I neglect M’s potential
role in discovering adaptations, because M’s adaptation incentives would not directly vary with
the governance structures I analyse.)
As elected delegate of the public, it is G’s job to pressure M to satisfy changes in e￿ective
public demand: G can exert e￿ort i to discover what the public want and how to satisfy
their demands. The public can also participate: A exerts e￿ort j in investigations to discover
socially valuable adaptations and in political participation (or communication) to ensure that
G understands public demands. E￿orts i and j combine to increase the expected increase
in social value from implementing the best service adaptation that becomes feasible. (Note
that best is de￿ned from G and M’s bilateral perspective since A is not directly involved in
negotiation.) I denote the corresponding adapted contract by Z, again with the non-contingent
transfer set to just compensate the standard costs of provision. For simplicity, I assume that,
while e is speci￿c to G, e helps M satisfy Z; so M’s payo￿ from enforcement of contract Z
throughout the trading period is again w(e). G’s payo￿ from Z is b + v (i;j) where v ￿ 0,
increasing and concave in i and j, represents the gain in public welfare from the adaptation,
as internalised by G.
Until section 5 (on public pressure), I assume G internalises a fraction g of public welfare,
where g ￿ 1 represents G’s benevolence (public-service orientation) and/or G’s electoral moti-
vation to gain public approval. Similarly, A internalises a ￿xed fraction a ￿ 1 of public welfare;
typically a < 1, because the public face a free-rider problem in helping G to improve public
services.8 So payo￿s from X are b for G, 1
gb for the public, a
gb for A, w(e) for M; payo￿s from
Z are v(i;j) for G, 1
gv(i;j) for the public, a
gv(i;j) for A and w(e) for M.
It is also important for G to be accountable to public demands for reducing taxation. I
assume a shadow value 1+￿ of public funds where ￿ > 0 represents tax distortions; to simplify
notation, I use the parameter l = 1+￿
g which captures G’s marginal payo￿ cost of using public
funds. I normalise time discounting to zero. If G pays M up-front transfers t0 and subsequent
transfers t in addition to the transfers enforced by contract Z, then G, A and M’s overall
payo￿s are:




(b + v (i;j) ￿ l(t0 + t)) ￿ j
uM = t0 + t + w(e) ￿ e
8E.g. a =
1
N if e￿ective mobilisation j equals the sum ￿
N
n=1jn of N individual e￿orts jn chosen simultaneously
by a homogeneous and uncoordinated public.
7The following regularity assumptions guarantee su￿ciency of ￿rst-order conditions.
Assumption 1 w
00
(e) < 0 < w0 (e) 8e ￿ 0 and lime!0+ w
0
(e) = 1, lime!1 w0 (e) = 0.
Assumption 2 v (i;j) is negative semi-de￿nite and limi!0+ vi (i;j) = limj!0+ vj (i;j) = 1,
limi!1 vi (i;j) = limj!1 vj (i;j) = 0, 8i;j ￿ 0.
I assume information is symmetric and M and G negotiate a symmetric Nash bargain. So
Z is enforced in equilibrium. Privatisation and contract length matter because they a￿ect
default outcomes in bargaining and hence the equilibrium choices of i;j;e. I capture these
e￿ects in a simple four-stage model and then relate to the arbitrary ￿nite horizon setting of
Ellman (2006). I write ‘￿xing ￿’ to denote commitment to enforcement of contract X for a
fraction ￿ of stage 3 trading; no contract is enforced on the remainder and I denote this by
the \null" contract ￿.9 Timing:
Stage 0: G, M negotiate over stage 3 contracts f￿;Xg, ￿xing ￿ and transfer t0.
Stage 1: G, A, M sink their investments i;j;e.
Stage 2: G, M negotiate over stage 3 contracts f￿;X;Zg and additional transfer t.
Stage 3: G, M trade (jointly or with their market alternatives).
The transfer t0 agreed up-front (i.e. at stage 0) cannot depend on observed investments,
so it plays no role in determining investment e￿ciency. The subsequent transfer t, negotiated
on top of contract Z at stage 2, depends on the stage 2 default payo￿s which in turn depend
on the mode of governance and length of contract as I now show.
2.1 E￿ort under public provision
Under public provision, M has to be continually motivated to implement the basic trade. I
assume G needs a basic service enough (b > 0), that in default of renegotiation to motivate
M, G would ￿nd an alternative manager M0 to implement the adapted service. Investments i
and j are not speci￿c to M, so G can exploit i and j in this default. G’s default payo￿ (see
interpretation just below) is
b ￿ lt0 + v (i;j)
Normalising M’s alternative payo￿ to 0, M’s default payo￿ is simply t0.
G’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore l ￿ w(e). In the Nash bargain, G gains
l￿w(e)
2 and M gains
w(e)
2 . So in subgame perfect equilibrium, G chooses i to maximise




9P and A may trade in stage 1, but I leave implicit the contract that enforces this trade.















The investment e￿orts sunk in stage 1 are therefore characterised by the ￿rst-order conditions
vi (i;j) = 1 w0 (e) = 2 a
gvj (i;j) = 1 (4)
2.2 E￿ort under private provision
Under private provision, G has less power and credibility to exploit investments i and j (see
next subsection); so in default of renegotiation, G only appropriates a fraction 1 ￿ k of the
adaptation return v (i;j), unless the contract has expired, in which case G appropriates the
full marginal return v (i;j) by negotiating with M0. If the contract has length ￿, G’s default
payo￿ is
b ￿ lt0 + (￿(1 ￿ k) + (1 ￿ ￿))v (i;j) = b ￿ lt0 + (1 ￿ ￿k)v (i;j)
Meanwhile, the contract, protects M’s cost-reduction e￿orts, by forcing G to pay a ￿xed price
for the basic service. So M appropriates the full cost reduction w(e) over fraction ￿ of stage
3. M’s default payo￿ under privatisation is
t0 + ￿ ￿ w(e)
G’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore l(1 ￿ ￿)w(e) + ￿k ￿ v (i;j). G and M’s
respective renegotiation gains are 1
2 and 1
2l of this sum. So G chooses i to maximise









w(e) ￿ i (5)
























The ￿rst-order conditions are now
vi (i;j) = 2
2￿￿k w0 (e) = 2
1+￿
a
gvj (i;j) = 2
2￿￿k (8)
92.3 Interpretations of k and ￿
There are two types of tradeo￿ associated with privatisation. One from the shift in control
rights, the other from performance contracting (which shifts M’s default obligations). Both
changes generate a similar tradeo￿ between incentives for cost-cutting by M and incentives
for accountability e￿orts by G and A. I focus on the contractual dimension and then brie￿y
describe the control rights interpretation.
If G and M do not sign a long-term performance contract (that is, an agreement at stage
0 to enforce X at stage 3), then in default of an agreement at stage 2, G switches to trading
with a substitute M0 of M who provides the adapted service at the standard cost (M’s cost
plus w(e)). This is credible, since b > 0 induces G to replace or sideline an uncooperative
public manager. Hence G’s payo￿ of b + v (i;j) ￿ l ￿ t0. On the other hand, if G and M
commit to X at stage 0, they cannot switch to alternative trades. They might still engage in
\side-trades." M’s side-trading returns are independent of e;i;j, so I normalise M’s additional
side-trade value to 0 { hence M’s default payo￿ of t0 + w(e). Meanwhile, G could pay a
substitute provider M0 to provide the service adaptation alongside the basic public service
provided by M. Unfortunately, this market access by G is rarely so e￿ective: (1) the long-
term contract may directly restrict this market access (e.g. private caterers usually demand
exclusive territories) or transfer to M control rights that G needs for adaptations (e.g. access
to the school kitchen); (2) G cannot credibly duplicate the basic service by buying the adapted
service from M0 unless the additional value from adaptation is very high; (3) even when it is
technologically feasible to have M0 provide the adaptation service without the basic service,
this would waste the economies of scope from having a single party provide and coordinate
them. To capture G’s reduced market access, I assume side-trading increases G’s payo￿ b￿lt0
(from the basic contract at transfer price t0) by (1 ￿ k)v (i;j), where k 2 (0;1] captures the
\market-shielding" e￿ect of contracting (see Ellman (2006) for a model endogenising k).
The performance contracting set-up abstracts from the restrictions typically imposed on
employees, so public provision is equivalent to setting ￿ = 0.10 To link to HSV’s theory of
privatisation based on shifts in control rights, I ￿x contract length (as in HSV), and reinterpret
￿ as the proportion of control rights held by M relative to G. So raising ￿ enhances M’s ability
to exploit e without needing G’s cooperation, but (as in Grossman and Hart (1986) raising
￿ also lowers G’s control rights and hence G’s ability to exploit i and j. Parameter k now
captures asset-speci￿city. This aspect of privatisation lowers adaptation incentives, because M
can then hold up any asset-speci￿c components of i and j even after the performance contract
10I also abstract from the transaction costs of designing X in advance (i.e. at stage 0) which, being avoidable
by the ￿ = 0 ‘corner solution’, would favour public provision (see Bajari and Tadelis (2003)).
10expires.
3 Accountability comparisons
The above pair of ￿rst-order conditions demonstrate how privatisation increases M’s cost-
cutting incentives from 1
2w0 (e) in equation 4 to the higher fraction 1+￿
2 of w0 (e) in equation
8, but decreases G’s incentives to support adaptations down from the full marginal incentive
vi (i;j) to the fraction 2￿￿k
2 of vi (i;j). Privatisation also decreases A’s incentives to work
for adaptations (see 3.2 below on this indirect holdup) from the full margin
g
avj (i;j) down
to the fraction 2￿￿k
2 of
g
avj (i;j). Furthermore, when i and j are strategic complements,
privatisation’s negative e￿ects on i and j are mutually reinforcing as I show in 3.3. To clarify
the accountability interpretations of these e￿ects, I describe in turn the cases where A takes
no action, where G takes no action and then the common case where A and G’s e￿orts are
strategic complements.
3.1 Government attentiveness
To isolate the e￿ect of privatisation on G’s incentives, I ￿rst analyse the case where v = v (i),
independent of j. v (i) measures G’s success in identifying or discovering adaptations that
are valued by the public (and politically salient). So i represents G’s e￿orts to pay attention
to public concerns about service quality. For instance, when there is a public demand for a
concrete change, i raises the probability that G recognises that the demand is serious (enough
to a￿ect G’s reelection) and/or i raises the probability that G works out how to satisfy public
demands. So v (i) can be interpreted as a measure of G’s responsiveness to public demand -
how likely it is that G manages to please or placate the general public. Attentiveness i raises
G’s ability and propensity to respond.
Under public provision, G’s e￿ort i is determined by the ￿rst order condition, v0 (i) = 1 (see
equation 4). M is unable to hold up G, because investment i is general and G can therefore
exploit i by replacing or sidelining an uncooperative M. In contrast, under private provision, M
can hold up G, because i is an adaptation investment; the greater the basic contract’s duration
￿, the longer G must wait before able to access e￿ective market alternatives. G’s incentive is
thereby reduced by the fraction 1 ￿ ￿k
2 (see equation 8). Accordingly, ipublic > iprivate;￿ for
any contract of length ￿ > 0 and privatisation reduces G’s attentiveness by more, the greater
is ￿ (since 1 ￿ ￿k
2 falls with ￿). Since the social return on i is given by 1
gv (i) and g < 1,
public provision also generates under-attentiveness. So private provision, by exacerbating
this problem, is clearly harmful to accountability. The following proposition records these
11points along with the, now well-known, advantage of privatisation { namely, that long-term
contracting increases M’s incentive (1+￿
2 w0 (e)) to cut provision costs.
Proposition 1 Governments are more attentive and responsive to public demand when service
provision is public. On the other hand, privatisation motivates cost-reducing investments
by the service-provider. Increasing the private provider’s contract length ￿ augments both
the accountability de￿cit and cost advantage of the private mode. For v = v (i) : epublic <





In sum, privatisation requires long-term contracts and transfer of control rights to pro-
tect M’s investments e in cost-reduction from G’s market threats, but the long-term contracts
and reduced control rights reduce G’s access to market alternatives that protect G’s adapta-
tion investments. So while privatisation reduces G’s holdup of M’s self-investments (in cost-
reduction), it increases M’s holdup of G’s adaptation investments. Privatisation encourages
cost reduction but demotivates G from working to understand and satisfy changing public
demand. This result is directly relevant for situations where public pressure is independent
of government attentiveness and service privatisation. For instance, A might be an action
group whose members’ time and budget constraints are always binding or the public might be
entirely passive (beyond voting in elections). In the next section, I allow for an active role of
the public in generating political accountability.
3.2 Public mobilisation
In this subsection, I show how privatisation enables M to e￿ect what I call an \indirect" hold
up on A. The private provider M cannot hold up the public directly, since the public never
negotiate or pay M directly. However, when the public invest j in mobilisation, they create an
adaptation surplus. I show that, provided M is private, M is able to expropriate a share of this
surplus by in￿ating the price of adaptation charged to G. In this way, M e￿ectively siphons
money from the public, since G pays o￿ M using public funds.
Formally, I study an activist subgroup of the public, A. A invests e￿ort j to pressure G to
make an adaptation. This raises G’s value from adapting. Under private provision, G relies on
M to implement the adaptation, so M can demand a share of G’s bene￿t. Because G transfers
utility to M using public funds, A su￿ers when M holds up G. Since A is the investor, the
real holdup is perpetrated by M against A, but it is indirect since M cannot negotiate with A.
Under public provision, G can get M to implement the adaptation at actual cost, so A evades
the indirect holdup. The impact of the indirect holdup introduced by privatisation is that A
has less incentive to mobilise. This can be seen by comparing A’s ￿rst-order conditions in
12equations 4 and 8; private provision reduces A’s adaptation incentives by the fraction 2
2￿￿k.
Again public provision has an accountability advantage over private provision. The following
proposition records this result, which simply reiterates the tradeo￿ of public accountability
against privatisation’s cost-e￿ciency.
Proposition 2 The public are more likely to mobilise and induce valuable service adapta-
tions when service provision is public, but as before, privatisation better motivates cost-
reducing investments by the service-provider. This tradeo￿ is again increasing in the
private provider’s contract length ￿. For v = v (j) : epublic < eprivate (￿);jpublic >





The novel message is that privatisation exacerbates the problem of motivating the public
to impose accountability on the government. This new result is intuitive. A only gains from
pressuring its agent, G, if G can respond e￿ciently. Under public provision, G responds by
adapting at cost. Under private provision, the response is less attractive to A, since M extracts
a share of G’s adaptation surplus in the form of an in￿ated adaptation price.
3.3 Strategic complementarity and substitutability in accountability
Investments i and j are often strategic complements: the greater is G’s attentiveness, the more
sense it makes for A to investigate and communicate public preferences and to apply pressure
on G; conversely, the more active is A, the more G can gain from being attentive to A and
to service issues.11 In this subsection, I show how strategic complementarity between i and j
exacerbates the problem of privatisation, by analysing the mutual reinforcing knock-on e￿ects
of privatisation’s direct e￿ects on i and j. Even though i and j are chosen simultaneously,
my assumptions ensure that equilibria are unique, and it is straightforward to prove that the
e￿ects identi￿ed in propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold, with an increase in the advantages
from public provision. When i and j are substitutes, the overall accountability e￿ect is as
before, but one of i and j could move in the opposite direction.
Proposition 3 If public pressure and government attentives are strategic complements { i.e.
vi;j (i;j) > 0 { then: (i) epublic < eprivate (￿), jpublic > jprivate (￿);8￿ > 0,
deprivate(￿)
d￿ >
11There are two reasons why vi;j > 0 might hold. First, communication is a two-sided activity: G must exert
e￿ort to listen to the demands of A (e.g. by inviting public participation and conducting surveys) or at least to
monitor their political signi￿cance (in the case of public pressure on a reluctant government). So some degree of
complementarity is always present and it is common to assume complementarity over the full range of relevant
e￿orts (see e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005). Second, G’s awareness of public preferences and public pressure
only leads to adaptations if G knows how to satisfy these demands, so G’s e￿orts in monitoring service provision
and alternative provision options complement A’s e￿orts to communicate and apply pressure.
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djprivate(￿)
d￿ < 0; (ii) vij raises ipublic ￿ iprivate (￿) and jpublic ￿ jprivate (￿) but has no









Because of these complementarities, the timing of play is important. A sequential set-up
in which the public move ￿rst (and the government observe this before moving) is plausible if
one interprets the government’s main receptiveness choice as one over e￿ort to work out how
to satisfy the mobilised public’s demands. Having the public move second is relevant if, e.g.,
the government organises public meetings about service preferences and the public respond
by supplying e￿ort to actively participate in these meetings. The simultaneous setup that I
treat here is relevant if the public cannot observe government e￿orts and the government must
exert e￿ort to discover the e￿ectiveness of a mobilisation. The sequential time orderings reduce
the likelihood of multiple equilibria and shift the e￿ort levels, but do not interfere with the
qualitative nature of my results.
4 The privatisation decision
In this section, I analyse the choice between the private and public provision alternatives,
given the accountability and cost implications derived above. I study two cases. In the ￿rst,
the government decides the provision mode. In the second, voters decide; for instance, the
privatisation/municipalisation choice could be put to a referendum (voter preferences are also
in￿uential when political parties can make electoral commitments over their plans to privatise
or nationalise/municipalise). Costs of switching between private and public modes of provision
(say from expertise and organisational capital that build up in support of the current provision
mode) may generate a strong status quo bias not captured here. However, these costs make it
all the more important to be able to predict the long-run comparative levels of social welfare
under the alternative provision modes. This section helps to answer this question, because
the endogenous level of accountability for adaptations is a key component of long-run service
quality.
If both the markets for employee managers and service contractors are perfectly competitive
at stage 0, the negotiation over t0 (M’s salary if a public employee and contract price if private)
ensures that M’s average equilibrium payo￿ equals M’s market opportunity cost which I denote
by r. So the respective values of t0 in the public and private cases are determined by equating




M from equations 2 and 6 with r. Substituting for t0 into
equations 1 and 5, respectively, reveals that G’s payo￿ is given by the bilateral surplus with
14M evaluated at the subgame-perfect levels of (e;i;j):
u
private;￿
G = b + v (i;j) ￿ l(r + e ￿ w(e)) ￿ i at (e;i;j) satisfying equation 8
u
public
G = b + v (i;j) ￿ l(r + e ￿ w(e)) ￿ i at (e;i;j) satisfying equation 4
Whenever G chooses the private mode of governance, G chooses the contract length ￿ that
maximises u
private;￿
G . As explained in subsection 2.3, I have set up the model so that public
provision is represented by the corner solution in which it is optimal for G to set ￿ = 0.
This permits almost direct application of the results from proposition 4a of Ellman (2006):
increasing l is equivalent to raising the \importance" of self-investment e, so from G and M’s
perspective, the optimal contract length increases with l. In particular, there exists ^ l such that
it is optimal to set ￿ = 0, i.e. to adopt the public provision mode, for all l > ^ l. (Since this cut-
o￿ is determined by G’s preference, I write ^ lG.) To simplify, I assume w000 (e)w0 (e) < 4(w00 (e))
2
and the same for v with respect to i and j { these are su￿cient conditions for all the problems
of (G and A and the public) optimising over ￿ to be regular.
Proposition 4 If the government places su￿cient weight on the quality of the public service
relative to the cost of public funds, the government prefers public to private provision:







This result is intuitive. From G and M’s perspective, i and e should be such that w0 (e) = 1
and vi (i;j) = 1 and the higher is j, the better. So they are concerned about underinvestment
in e, i and j. Privatisation raises e towards the optimum level, but exacerbates the under-
investment in i and j since it reduces G’s ability to appropriate the returns from improving
service quality.
5 Public pressure and accountability
In the introduction, I presented my two leading interpretations of the accountability mecha-
nism. In the ￿rst interpretation, accountability is enhanced by discovery and communication
of adaptation alternatives. In the second interpretation, accountability increases with public
pressure. In this section, I formalise the second approach. I ￿rst show how the pressure inter-
pretation can be consistent with my payo￿ assumptions. I then explain how public pressure
may decrease G’s payo￿ and I derive the implications.
When i and j represent public pressure, the degree to which G internalises public welfare
becomes endogenous. The relationship between G and A’s payo￿s is more complex. For in-
stance, pressure that a￿ects G’s value of an adaptation, need not have any e￿ect on the public’s
15value of that adaptation. Nonetheless, pressure that raises the likelihood that the adaptation
will be implemented by G and M in equilibrium. It is as if adaptations that are not su￿ciently
politically salient to be attractive to G had not been discovered. So publicity investments have
a similar e￿ect to participatory investments that help discover useful adaptations. I formalise
with a simple model in which G and A’s equilibrium investment returns are again proportional.
A single possible service adjustment, such as ￿xing a problem in the public service, becomes
apparent over time. Pressure j raises the probability q (j) that the service adaptation is as
politically salient as the basic service value and the public cost of funds. For instance, the
majority of the public might observe the adaptation decision before voting with probability q (j)
and otherwise not observe it at all. The basic service and public expenditure (surplus/de￿cit)
are always politically salient, so G never implements non-salient adaptations. G therefore
implements the adaptation with probability q (j). G’s electoral concerns lead G to internalise
the fraction g of the public value from the basic service and to internalise, when politically
salient, the same fraction of the public value S from adaptation. So G’s expected gain from
making adaptations at cost is gSq (j). A’s gain from implementation of the adaptation is aS {
independently of whether j succeeds in creating political salience { but since adaptations are
only implemented when salience is high, A’s expected gain is aSq (j). In this special case, G
and A’s expected payo￿s remain exactly proportional in the ratio
g
a.12 So the above results
continue to hold.
However, public pressure usually has an additional e￿ect: it hurts bad or unlucky politicians
(as well as helping good or lucky politicians and increasing incentives). The simplest motivation
for this claim is that an uninformed public cannot distinguish and therefore vote against bad
politicians, so a public pressure campaign that informs the public lowers a bad politician’s
chances of success. If bad politicians are those that fail to make valuable adaptations, public
pressure j reduces G’s payo￿ in the contingency where G fails to make the adaptation. I could
therefore assume that when the service issue is politically salient, G su￿ers a loss ￿￿ if G fails
to implement the adaptation; ￿xing G’s payo￿ from implementing the adaptation, G’s payo￿
accordingly falls by ￿q (j). An alternative perspective, with the same implications, posits that
the public always gains some payo￿ ￿ from the service, where ￿ is high if the service situation
is favourable, but is only aware when the service issue is salient, so G only internalises g￿ with
probability q (j).
G and A’s returns on j are no longer exactly proportional, but the holdup results are
12This example is readily extended. E.g. if G is only su￿ciently aware of public pressure and how to respond
with probability q (i), then the probability of an adaption in equilibrium is q (i)q (j). Again G and A’s expected
gains remain proportional.
16unchanged { they only depend on G and A’s bene￿ts from equilibrium adaptations and the
losses from public transfers to M. What changers are G’s preferences for privatisation relative
to the public’s preferences. It is immediate that G has a stronger preference/willingness to
accept j, the greater is ￿. Since j is higher under public provision, G is more likely to prefer
public provision, the greater is ￿. Meanwhile, ￿ has no e￿ect on A’s and the public’s preferences
over provision mode.
Proposition 5 In the pressure model, j varies with the private/public choice of mode exactly
as before; so G’s preference for privatising is increasing in ￿.
This proposition re￿ects how G may use privatisation as a way to escape accountability
pressures. I verify that the public’s privatisation preference is independent of ￿, by noting that
the utilitarian measure of social welfare is,
1
g
(b + q (j)v (i) + ￿ ￿ l(r + e ￿ w(e))) + r ￿ i ￿ j
It follows immediately that,
Proposition 6 From the public’s perspective, a high value of ￿ biases G towards public provi-
sion and a low value of ￿ - say, bad news about the public service which could potentially
be blamed on G - bias G towards privatising.
6 Discussion
Undesirable accountability. Pragmatists may point out that all my arguments are invalid
or inverted in situations where public pressure is infeasible or undesirable.13 Acknowledging
these problems helps to re￿ne the theory’s empirical predictions and policy recommendations.
First, in settings where public pressure possibilities are remote, the accountability bene￿ts of
public provision may be small and with partial market pricing to buttress private provision,
privatisation may be preferred by many. Consistent with this, Jacobson and Tarr (1995)
point out that in the U.S., water supply tends to be privatised when the recipient public are
subdivided by political boundaries. However, since democratic accountability builds up over
time, public provision’s tendency to induce public activism may have vital long-run bene￿ts
in settings where democratic pressure is initially limited.
13In my theory, public provision maximises dynamic accountability, because the government can always force
a public provider to adapt to changing demand: the government can replace or at least sideline an incumbent
public manager who disobeys orders to adapt the service. Public management is much less e￿ective when rigidly
bureaucratic, but my theory suggests increasing bureaucratic accountability instead of privatising.
17Second, accountability can reduce welfare if the public are su￿ciently myopic or manipu-
lated by strong interest groups. For instance, economists have long argued that central bankers
should be immunised against myopic electoral pressures and more recently, Maskin and Tirole
(2004) analysed the problem of \pandering" when public servants are elected (\politicians")
rather than appointed (like a judge). (They study information problems rather than moral
hazard.14) Bennedsen’s (2000) lobbying model and Milrom and Roberts’ (1988) in￿uence cost
model point to related concerns. In my initial model, there is no risk of A taking excessive
e￿orts, because A’s goals are fully aligned with other members of the public. However, when
A is replaced by a special interest lobby, G might divert attention onto selected public services
that bene￿t those interests. This creates a risk that G and A’s e￿orts reduce social welfare.
Privatisation might then be advantageous by reducing the risk of over-politicising the public
service.15
Bureaucracy. It is possible for accountability to be lower under public provision if the
mayor has di￿culty monitoring and controlling public servants who are self-interested. How-
ever, these accountability problems if bureaucrats can be forced to be more responsive to
politicians (what Adams and Hess (2000) call \de-Sir-Humphreying" the civil service). Fur-
thermore, it is sometimes possible to make the heads of service providing agencies directly
accountable to the public by having the public elect these heads. This step towards direct
democracy has been studied by Besley and Coate (2003) among others as I discuss next.
Direct democracy. My analysis suggests unusual questions, such as what would happen
if the public could vote directly to select a ￿rm to provide services under a long-term contract,
and perhaps also vote directly to oust the ￿rm if activists manage to collect enough signatures
of discontent? Given that the public bene￿ts are dispersed across many people, monitoring
possible providers and writing e￿ective contracts tends to require specialised agents, such as
the mayor or a service agency head. Nonetheless, asking this question can illuminate design
issues. The mayor is only useful if e￿ectively monitored by the public, but why is it easier to
monitor the mayor than the service provider?
14The \public choice" school argues that public management leads to a bureaucratic interest group that
interferes with accountability, but privatised provision also generates interest groups. Accountability is harmful
when politicised actors pander to a myopic public (see Maskin and Tirole (2005)), but unlike central banking, the
fundamental problem in public service provision is contract incompleteness, not time inconsistency. Democratic
accountability is needed, because services must be adapted to unanticipated changes in public demand.
15When i and j reduce the salience of other political decisions, there is a risk of creating an imbalance in
accountability. On the other hand, enhancing e may not always be advantageous either. Privatisation could
then be damaging by over-motivating e. For instance, if M’s investments in cost-cutting reduce G’s payo￿ from
the basic service contract, there is a risk that long-term contracting leads to excessive investment by M { see
HSV or Ellman (2006) who categorises this as a negative cross e￿ect.
18Information access. The cost of getting information or veri￿able evidence about service
quality can be a major barrier to activist pressure. Since public organisations are often gov-
erned by laws that guarantee greater public access to information, privatisation may decrease
accountability by simply restricting access to information. From a theoretical perspective, it
is not obvious why transparency cannot be imposed as a condition for eligibility of private
providers in public service contract competitions. One possibility is that the appropriate gov-
ernance structure will take time to create. Certainly, private service providers work hard to
argue that their legal obligations to their shareholders and their competitive pressures require
that they maintain most of the standard privacy rights of private ￿rms. Another possibility
is that information disclosure cannot be forced by contract. The mayor needs to monitor and
pressure for transparency. If, as argued above, private provision shifts most responsibilities
onto the provider, then the mayor may more often manage to excuse herself for not forcing
information disclosure, say by pleading ignorance.
Endogenising the government’s preference function. In a companion paper, I
analyse voting explicitly. Voters study the incumbent mayor’s performance in order to predict
their expected payo￿s from reelecting this mayor. This permits foundations for the assumptions
about the government’s payo￿ function used in this paper. There, I consider two possibilities.
One is to assume that voters are retrospective as in Ferejohn (1974). The other is to allow
for forward-looking voters in a rational choice setting where G’s only goal is to take ego rents
R from holding o￿ce. This approach allows me to analyse a \responsibility shifting" e￿ect of
privatisation.
Contract length, design and inherited holdups. Ellman (2006) identi￿es a tradeo￿
between lengthening performance contracts to better motivate cost-cutting investments by the
provider and shortening the contracts to reduce holdup of adaptation investments. Here, I
extend this result by analysing the possibility that an incumbent government is replaced by
an opposition party, before the incumbent’s performance contract with a private provider has
come to an end.
Analysis of the electoral competition reveals a particularly worrying e￿ect of contracts that
span across elections. Accountability is much enhanced when opposition parties can make
speci￿c policy commitments { see Austen-Smith and Banks (1989 and 2005). For instance,
the public are more likely to oust an incumbent mayor for failing to ￿x a service problem
(such as water quality falling below a recognised standard) when the opposition mayor has
credibly committed to ￿x the problem. Unfortunately, if the service is managed by a private
provider under a performance contract that spans the electoral cycle, this mayor su￿ers from
a particularly pernicious holdup problem: if she wins after committing to solve the service
19problem, the service provider can hold her up over the entire value of her reputation for
keeping promises. If voters anticipate the tax implications of this \inherited holdup", such
commitments are less attractive to voters as well as opposition parties. Privatisation therefore
reduces the likelihood that opposition mayors make ￿rm policy commitments to improve service
quality. This concern is particularly signi￿cant in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) where
the private service provider is also responsible for building the facilities to be used (see Hart
(2003)), because the private party usually then needs a contract in excess of ￿ve years to
properly exploit its non-contractible sunk cost investments. So, for settings where e￿ective
privatisation requires contracts that exceed the four or ￿ve year term limit on governments, my
analysis suggests that privatisation is particularly damaging - at least if political accountability
is important.
7 Conclusion
Critics have claimed that under privatisation, the government will wash its hands of service
problems and quality will decline. This paper demonstrates a rigorous foundation for a less
extreme version of this concern. The blunt version of this pessimistic view - maintaining that
people will not hold the government responsible for policy outcomes because privatisation
places control in the hands of a private company - is incomplete. The government’s role (as
holder of the purse-strings) remains critical under privatisation. In particular, the government
can choose to which private company to delegate (just as it may control which civil servant
is in charge of the relevant public agency under public provision) and even during a given
provider’s contractual term, the government can at least negotiate (o￿ering to pay additional
costs if need be).16 A more re￿ned version of the argument therefore had to explain why,
under privatisation, the government might be held less responsible and/or why pressuring the
government should be less e￿ective.
Privatisation of public services transfers control rights and contractual obligations to providers.
I showed that, while improving cost reduction incentives, privatisation may decrease account-
ability and responsiveness of government to public concerns about service quality. I endo-
genised public mobilisations that can make government accountable for service quality. Politi-
cal accountability induces the incumbent government to adapt services to meet public demand,
but under privatisation, the provider can hold up the government by charging an in￿ated price
for service adaptation. This holdup has an externality on the public, because the government
16The government can also regulate, but regulation is necessarily limited: in the extreme case of unlimited
regulation, the government retains full residual control rights; this is e￿ectively public provision.
20pays using public funds. The holdup therefore reduces the public’s incentive to mobilise to
apply pressure on the government. The holdup also directly demotivates the government from
exerting e￿ort to evaluate public demands and their electoral implications. Finally, public
mobilisation and government receptiveness are often complementary, making the two e￿ects
mutually reinforcing.
My theory can explain the evidence that privatisation sometimes lowers service quality,
and the mechanism is very di￿erent to alternative explanations, which identify a \negative
externality of incentives\ (on non-contractible quality) { for instance, HSV argue that privati-
sation reduces service quality by raising incentives to reduce cost. Those explanations cannot
explain why consumers might, as in Kwoka’s (2000) dataset, bene￿t from lower unit prices
when a service is publicly managed. By contrast, my accountability mechanism can explain
this: privatisation dissuades the public from mobilising to pressure the government to restrain
consumer prices.
My analysis has a number of policy implications. In particular, if privatisation is pursued,
then the creation of credible cost-measurement agencies (to allow cost-plus contracting), the
adoption of dual suppliers, the subsidisation of incumbent challengers and the use of shorter
contracts (at least not spanning elections which create an inherited holdup problem) o￿er
partial but imperfect ways to reduce the accountability problem; the formation of relational
contracts could also help, but is at odds with the anti-corruption strategy of requiring selection
of the lowest bidder. Interestingly, recent suggestions to require private providers to exceed a
minimal satisfaction rating in consumer surveys e￿ectively represent a small step towards direct
democracy where people’s votes select the service provider. Further work could investigate the
use of not-for-pro￿t restrictions and direct election of the public servants controlling service
provision.
In sum, the main contributions of this paper are to identify settings in which privatisation
is particularly damaging to political accountability and to indicate how privatisation could be
designed to limit the interference with accountability.
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9 Appendix
Proof of proposition 3
The ￿rst-order condition for e is unchanged so proposition 1 gives the result for e. The ￿rst-
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where ￿ = vii (i(￿);j (￿))vjj (i(￿);j (￿)) ￿ (vij (i(￿);j (￿)))
2 > 0 by assumption 2.
If vij > 0, then i and j both decrease with ￿ (since vjj;vii < 0 and g;a > 0); furthermore,
the rate of decrease is increasing in vij.
If vij < 0, then either i or j still decreases (else ajvjjj < gjvijj and gjviij < ajvijj so
viivjj < v2
ij, contrary to assumption 2); furthermore, d
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23which is always negative since even when
g
a takes the value,
vij
vii, that maximises the term in
parenthesis, this term is still negative (it equals
vjjvii￿v2
ij
vii < 0). So the expected equilibrium
value of adaptations falls with ￿.
Proof of proposition 4
The proof is a direct application of proposition 4b from Ellman (2006). There is one minor
complication: since j is chosen by a third party (A), G and M neglect the costs of j; this changes
the form of the optimand, but the bene￿t through j from increasing ￿ (vj (i;j)j0 (￿) > 0) is
independent of l, so the proposition remains valid.
24